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We discuss how the standard Cost-Benefit Analysis should be modified in order to take risk (and 
uncertainty) into account. We propose different approaches used in finance (Value at Risk, 
Conditional Value at Risk, Downside Risk Measures, and Efficiency Ratio) as useful tools to 
model the impact of risk in project evaluation. After introducing the concepts, we show how they 
could be used in CBA and provide some simple examples to illustrate how such concepts can be 
applied to evaluate the desirability of a new project infrastructure. 
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Risk is an important element in all investment decisions. This is particularly true for long lead 
transport investments.  
In recent years, a large number of failures of large projects have been observed. The Suez Canal 
and Euro Tunnel provide only two among numerous well known examples (see, e.g., Flyvbjerg, 
Bruzelius and Rothengatter, 2003). One way to avoid such failure is to implement a good and 
realistic Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA). Various sources of risk and uncertainty (see Section 1.2 
for a detailed distinction between risk and uncertainty) may affect the costs and the benefits of 
large scale projects. They correspond to, roughly speaking, demand uncertainty, supply 
uncertainty as well as to various macroeconomic shocks. It is our belief that risk and uncertainty 
are not well taken into account in current cost-benefit analysis. However, risk and uncertainty 
affect the major ingredients of the cost-benefit analysis during the whole process of construction, 
operation and maintenance of a project. Among other things, risk and uncertainty may affect: 
-  demand (passengers and freight), which is sometimes overestimated (e.g. for urban rail 
projects in the US) 
-  production cost (which are often underestimated) 
-  maintenance costs (which are typically underestimated, especially in developing countries) 
-  industry structure and regulation (see, e.g., the unexpected crucial impact of the low cost 
companies in the airline industry) 
-  market regulation: potential market ( i.e. relevant geographical) area and contestability  
-  execution time (which is typically underestimated to a large extent) 
-  macroeconomic and regional context (which, of course, have an influence on demand and 
interest rates) 
-  interest rate (which -in addition to the macroeconomic and regional context- depends on the 
level of risk anticipated by the lender and is therefore endogenous) 
-  other financial variables (which are difficult to predict especially in the case of Public Private 
Partnerships) 
-  human resources context (which crucially depends on the quality of the management) 
-  political environment (which is especially crucial for public infrastructures, both between 
political parties and between cities or regions) 
-  evaluation of secondary infrastructures (the main problem is the definition of the area of 
interest and of the alternative modes taken into account) 
-  accompanying measures (for example, CBA gives very different results in the railway case 
for passengers in Europe and in Japan because in Japan the railways draw a large proportion 
of benefits from accompanying infrastructures such as shopping centers; Japan Railways 
indeed receive income from rents on land they own and business activity) 
-  value of time, value of reliability and schedule delay costs (utility is reduced when actual 
arrival time differs from preferred arrival time) 
-  value of external costs (accidents, noise, human life, local and global environmental cost) 
-  scrap value (which is often forgotten). 
 
Since the seminal contribution of von Neuman and Morgenstern (1953), various tools are 
proposed by a few CBA studies and textbooks (see Pearman, 1983, Drèze and Stern, 1987, 
Morgan and Henrion, 1990, Boardman et al., 2005 or Mishan and Quah, 2007) to take risk into 
account. They include the sensitivity analysis (this approach often ignores correlation between the different variables), the expected value of including uncertainty, the analysis of different 
potential scenarios and Monte-Carlo simulations. 
 
We argue that the Monte Carlo analysis should be used on a more regular basis (see Morgan and 
Henrion, 1990), and should be based on a careful choice of realistic joint distributions, when the 
tails matter (which is the case in CBA studies). Indeed, the true distributions generally cannot be 
approximated in a satisfactory way via parameterized distributions such as Normal or even 
Extreme value (double exponential). In addition, a limited number of correlation parameters is 
usually not enough to model the joint distributions. All this means that an analysis of extreme 
values for the final output of a project is necessary in order to parameterize the relevant figures in 
CBA analysis. 
 
The first section of this paper discusses the role of risk sharing in the funding of infrastructure 
and the monetization of risks. The second section deals in more detail with the introduction of 
risk in cost benefit assessments of transport projects, and with the tools which can be used to 
evaluate projects in risky environments. The third section presents numerical examples for 
applying the different tools presented in Section 2, and concludes on the possible divergence of 
the different criteria. 
1. Previous literature and definitions 
1.1. Risk sharing and funding of infrastructure 
The different dimensions of risk are more or less correlated both from an intertemporal point of 
view and from a geographical point of view. For example, the demand for freight transportation 
depends on several factors including macro-economic situation. As a result, demand for transport, 
which may depend (positively or negatively) on business cycles will obey a complex inter-
temporal pattern. Indeed, traffic demand on highway A and highway B, for example, are spatially 
correlated at a given point in time for two opposing reasons. First, macro-economic fluctuations 
may affect both highways in a similar way, inducing a positive correlation between the demands 
on both highways. Second, since some drivers have to choose between the two highways, 
positive deviations of the demand on highway A (for example as a result of some unobserved 
marketing campaign) will be associated with negative deviations of the demand on highway B, 
inducing a negative correlation between the demands on both highways. As a result of these two 
opposing forces, the correlation between demand on highway A and highway B may be either 
positive or negative. 
 
The management of the funding of infrastructure (and in particular of infrastructure funds) 
depends crucially on the way the different facets of risk imbedded in the joint distribution of all 
relevant variables aggregate in the distribution of the discounted net benefit. We argue that the 
analysis limited to the first two moments (mean and variance) of this distribution is insufficient to 
provide useful advice on the best ways to manage infrastructure funds. The optimal (first-best) 
share of risk requires knowledge of the joint distribution of the discounted net benefits. Two 
standard arguments have been advocated by several authors and in particular by Laffont and 
Tirole (1993), to justify the fact that a system with a principal (the fund manager) and one or 
several agents (operators) may not behave optimally because of asymmetric information, 
inducing moral hazard (the agents do not perform their task with the optimal effort since its level 
cannot be observed directly by the principal) and adverse selection (only the “bad guys” are 
willing to participate). For example, Réseau Ferré de France (RFF), the principal, who owns the rail tracks has much less information about costs and demand, than Société Nationale des 
Chemins de Fer (SNCF), the agent, who operates the train and manages the tracks. This private 
information can be used by SNCF in the bargaining process. Moreover, the right incentive 
(second best) should induce the most efficient operators to be selected (thus solving adverse 
selection problems) and should have them operate with the optimal level of effort (thus solving 
moral hazard problems). Therefore, the level of risk that will be borne by each actor will be such 
that, on the one hand, the “right” operator should be willing to participate (participation 
constraint condition) and on the other hand that, once he is selected, he will perform his task with 
the optimal level of effort (incentive constraint condition). The second-best situations are 
analysed in detail by Laffont and Tirole who use rather simplified assumptions on risk (e.g. the 
variability is summarized by two states of nature, good and bad). We argue that such simplified 
assumptions should not be used in the context of infrastructure funding because the distribution 
tails really matter. In the case of CBA under risk, we therefore wish to use more realistic 
descriptions of the impacts of risk, taking into account the whole distribution of the net benefits. 
1.2. Risk and uncertainty 
The distinction between risk and uncertainty is important, although the treatment of this 
distinction remains very far from the current practice in CBA. A risky environment corresponds 
to situations in which probability distributions are known, whereas uncertainty corresponds to 
situations in which probabilities, and possibly the list of potential outcomes, are unknown. In this 
case, the decision maker should rely on some beliefs, which he can revise once he accumulates 
new relevant information. The distinction between risk and uncertainty has been extremely well 
summarized by Keynes (1937): 
 
“By ‘uncertain’ knowledge […] I do not merely distinguish what is known for certain 
from what is only probable. The game of roulette is not subject, in this sense, to 
uncertainty; nor the prospect of a Victory bond being drawn… Even the weather is only 
moderately uncertain. The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the 
prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest 
twenty years hence… About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any 
calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know”. 
 
Even though it has been shown that individuals behave differently when they face risk than when 
they face uncertainty, here we will mainly focus on risk. In the presence of uncertainty, the 
principle of minimum regret (“MinMax” criterion) introduced by Savage (1954) can be used, 
since it relies on the set of potential outcomes, but not on their probability distribution. For each 
scenario, the maximum regret corresponds to the largest difference between the outcome of the 
better project and the outcome of the worst project. The MinMax criterion then selects the project 
which minimizes (over all scenarios) the maximum regret (over all projects). A more detailed 
analysis of choice under uncertainty is beyond the scope of this research. 
1.3. Monetization of risk 
We will consider here a simple example due to Anand and Nalebuff (1987), which shows that 
small fluctuations may have potentially a very large impact in the CBA analysis when these 
shocks are correlated with the macroeconomic context. 
 
We use the following notation: z represents the certainty equivalent of a project with a random 
yield of Z (per capita). Y represents the (random) GNP (per capita). U(.) denotes the (increasing) utility function of a representative consumer and E[.] denotes the expectation operator. The 
certainty equivalent, z, is the unique solution of the following equation: 
 
  ( ) ( ) . UY Z UY z += + ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ EE   
Clearly, when the utility function is linear (risk neutrality), we have: z=E[Z]. When the utility 
function is concave (risk aversion) and risks are not correlated, we have z<E[Z]. 
 
We now argue that the variances and the covariance (for yield and GNP) play important roles in 
the measurement of the certainty equivalent. Let V[Z] denote the variance of the yield and let 
Cov(Y,Z) denote the covariance between yield and GNP. We also introduce the relative risk 
aversion RR(x), which is defined as RR(x)=-xU”(x)/U’(x). In this case, it can be shown that the 
certainty equivalent is given by the following relation: 
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Note that, in the standard case, relative risk aversion is positive since agents are risk averse. 
When  Y and  Z are positively correlated (the most likely case), the covariance magnifies the 
impact of the variability of the yield (negative effect on the certainty equivalent z). However, the 
situation can be qualitatively different (the covariance effect can offset the negative effect of the 
variability of yield) when Y and Z are negatively correlated. In that case, if the absolute value of 
the correlation between Y and Z is large enough and if the variance of Y is large compared to the 
variance of Z, (namely, if  [ ] [ ] [ ] ,/ 4 Corr Y Z Z Y <− V V , we have z>E[Z]. 
 
We provide below a simple numerical example. We assume that the value of the relative risk 
aversion is RR(.)=2 and that the per capita income is either 100 with certainty, or 110 or 90 with 
equal probabilities. We further assume that yield and GNP are negatively correlated (the reader 
can easily treat the more intuitive case in which yield and GNP are positively correlated). For a 










Table 1 Impact of variance and correlation (RR=2) 
Source: Adapted from Anand and Nalebuff (1987) 
 
This example shows that fluctuations in yield are not negligible if they are correlated with the 
economic performance. When the yield is negatively correlated with the GNP, the value of the 
Variable  Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
110 (Prob=½): state H  Per capita income Y  100 
90 (Prob=½): state L 
0.5 (Prob=½): state H 0.5 (Prob=½): state H  Yield project Z 
1.5 (Prob=½): state L 1.5 (Prob=½): state L 
(z-E[Z]) / E[Z] -02 5 % +10%project (here measured by z) would be underestimated if the correlation term were omitted. In our 
numerical example, z is 10% more than E[Z], whereas it would be 0.25% less than E [Z] with 
deterministic per capita income. With negative correlation, the project has a significant additional 
social value because it dampens the macroeconomic fluctuations. 
2. Risk and investment 
2.1. Net Present Value 
  Before the 1950s, two parameters were reported in the analysis of a project: the time horizon for 
full refund and the average rate of return of this investment. In the 50’s, several authors (see, e.g. 
Dean, 1951 and, later on, Lesourne, 1972) introduced the concept of Net Present Value (NPV), 
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where n denotes the time horizon considered, St denotes the net cash flow for year t (S denotes 
the vector of net cash flows over the time horizon considered), rt is the interest rate for period t (r 
denotes the vector of interest rates over the time horizon considered) and Rn is the residual value 
of investment at period n. The interest rate is denoted by r when it does not vary from period to 
period. When comparing one project to the laisser-faire policy, the project will be valuable if its 
NPV is positive. When comparing two projects, the project with the largest NPV  will be 
preferred. In practice, the cash flow depends on demand and cost, which are uncertain, and there 
may be some disagreement concerning the value of the interest rate to be chosen. The 
Commission of European Communities (1992) therefore advises that more risky projects use 
higher interest rates, although this is not obvious according to Boardman et al (1987). We discuss 
below better solutions for evaluating risky projects. The idea is to consider the net cash flow as a 
random variable and define a criterion to compare projects, which explicitly takes into account 
the randomness of St. 
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Usually, this derivative is negative, but it may be positive in some cases, when St is negative at 
some periods. Indeed, in Figure 1, the NPV is locally decreasing at the relevant interest rate r*, 
but it is increasing between the middle of segment [A,B] and the middle of the segment [B,C]. 
Note that, in this example, the NPV is positive when the interest rate is less than A or between B 
and C (and therefore the project is valuable), but it becomes negative when r>C or A<r<B (and 
the project is not valuable according to this criterion). 
  
 
The (endogenous) interest rate is given by the following formula (see, e.g., Gollier, 2001): 
 
  () 0 . 5 ² ² , t rm t δ γγ σ = +−  (1) 
where δ denotes the impatience rate, γ denotes the constant level of the relative risk aversion 
parameter, m(t) denotes the average growth rate of the GNP per capita over the period considered 
and σ represents the standard deviation of the growth rate of the GNP per capita. In the following 
example, we assume that δ =2%, γ =4, m(t)=2%. We also assume that σ is small enough that the 
last term in (1) can be omitted. Therefore, we get an interest rate of 10%. Note, however, that the 
interest rate used in France, for example, in the cost-benefit analysis is lower: the “rapport 
Boiteux 2” recommended 8%  in 2001 (see Commissariat Général du Plan, 2001). The rate 
recommended 4 years later is even lower (see Ministère de l’Equipement, des Transports et du 
Logement, 2005): from 4% for the short term to 3% for the very long term (100 years). 
 
The simplest criterion for comparing two risky projects is the Mean-Variance model. Modern 
portfolio theory models an asset return as a random variable, and models a portfolio as a 
weighted combination of assets; the return of a portfolio is thus the weighted combination of the 
assets returns. Moreover, a portfolio return is a random variable, and consequently has an 
expected value and a variance. The model assumes that investors are risk averse. This means that 
given two assets that offer the same expected return, investors will prefer the less risky one. Thus, 
an investor will take on increased risk only if compensated by higher expected returns. The exact 
trade-off will differ between investors, based on individual risk aversion level. The implication is 
that a rational investor who will not invest in a portfolio if a second portfolio exists with a more 
favourable risk-return profile, i.e. if for that level of risk an alternative portfolio exists which has 
better expected returns. In CBA, this criterion can be seen as the expected utility of the NPV when NPV has a Gaussian 
distribution and utility is of the CARA (negative exponential) form. The expected value of NPV 
is: 
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while its variance is: 
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In the Mean-Variance model, the value of a project for a decision-maker is measured by 
E[NPV(S,r)]-γ V[NPV(S,r)]. Recall that γ denotes the absolute risk aversion of the decision-
maker. A higher value of γ  means that the decision-maker is less willing to take risk. 
2.2. Stochastic order and utility functions 
When the NPV is stochastic, we have seen that the expected value and variance provide valuable 
information to rank projects. Although the mean-variance model has been widely used in finance, 
it has been criticized in the transport literature (see, e.g., de Palma and Picard, 2006). Indeed, it 
can be shown that with the Mean-Variance expected utility, an individual (enough risk averse) 
may prefer to receive X with probability 0.5 and Y>X with probability 0.5, than receiving X with 
probability 0.5 and Y+ε with probability 0.5 (ε>0). This violates a fundamental principle of 
expected utility theory (the monotonic property of the utility functions). More general criteria 
based on first or second order stochastic dominance can be used to rank projects. Let Fi denote 
the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the NPV corresponding to project i and Gi the 
integral of Fi. 
 
Project X is said to First-Order stochastically dominate project Y if its CDF is always lower. 
Mathematically, this means that: 
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It can be shown that there is a close relationship between First-Order stochastic dominance and 
the expected utility criterion. Let U(NPV) denote the utility of the decision-maker and I the set of 
increasing functions on R. We have (see Mas-Collel et al, 1995): 
 
  ( ) ( )
1 ,. DS X Y X Y UN P V UN P V U ≥⇔ ≥ ∀ ∈ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ EE I     
Unfortunately, first order stochastic dominance corresponds to a partial order which does not 
allow ranking projects when the CDF of their NPV cross. 
 
A stronger result can be obtained for risk averse decision-makers. Denote by CIC the set of 
continuous (implied by concavity), increasing and concave functions on R. 
 Project  X  is said to Second-Order stochastically dominate project Y  if its integrated CDF is 
always lower. Mathematically, this means that: 
 
  ( ) ( )
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It can be shown that there is a close relationship between Second-Order stochastic dominance and 
the expected utility criterion. We have equivalence between Second-Order stochastic dominance 
and expected utility for risk averse decision makers: 
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When the NPV  of two projects have the same expectation and the same variance, it is still 
possible to rank the two projects. It has been observed empirically that, in this case, decision-
makers have a greater dislike of distributions, which are thicker on the left than on the right. 
More precisely, Menezes, Geiss and Tressler (1980) have shown that a project X is preferred to a 
project Y for all preferences U(.) such that U '''(η) > 0 for all η if and only if Y has more 
downside risk than X. Recall (see Menezes et al., 1980) that Y has more downside risk than X if Y 
can be obtained from X  by a sequence of probability transfers which unambiguously shift 
dispersion from the right to the left (that is from large to small NPV) without changing the mean 
and the variance (MVPT, or Mean-Variance Preserving Transformations). Note that individuals 
such that U '''(η) > 0 dislike downside risk, but may be risk averse or risk lovers. 
 
The above discussion suggests that the expected value and variability are not enough to evaluate 
the distribution of cost or NPV, but that the tails of the distribution also matter. The distribution is 
here described by a density function with argument x corresponding either to NPV or to cost. 
When the decision-maker is interested in the NPV, he will focus on the left tail (very low NPV), 
whereas when he is interested in the cost, he will focus on the right tail (very large cost). We now 
turn to quantitative indicators explicitly focusing on the relevant tail (the one corresponding to 
the worst events). 
2.3. The Value at Risk 
The Value at Risk of a project for a probability p (for example 5%) corresponds to the smallest 
value (quantile) q such that no more than p% of the time NPVX is less than q. If the CDF of the 
random variable NPVX is continuous and strictly increasing, then the Value at Risk VaRX(p) = q 
satisfies the following equation: 
 
  ( ) ( ) Pr . XX NPV VaR p p ≤ =   
Recall that the CDF of NPVX is FX(.), so that VaRX(p) = (FX)
-1(p). More generally, when FX is 
only non-decreasing and right-continuous, the Value at Risk is: 
 
  () ( ) { } min | Pr . XX VaR p q NPV q p =≤ ≥   
Figure 2 illustrates the three potential cases. When FX is locally continuous and increasing (p1 
case), VaRX(p) = (FX)
-1(p). When FX is locally constant (p2 case), VaRX(p) is the lower bound on 
the interval such that FX(q)=p. When there is a discontinuity in FX (p3 case), FX(q)=p has no 
solution and VaRX(p) is the lower bound of the interval on the right side of the discontinuity. 
VaRX(p) can be interpreted as the NPVX of the least favourable outcome among the (1-p)% most favourable ones. When FX(.) is continuous and strictly increasing, VaRX(p) can also be interpreted 




The VaR of a project X expresses the level of risk acceptable for this project. It depends on two 
ingredients: the probability distribution of NPVX and the tolerance level of the decision-maker, 
which is measured by the probability p. Of course, the VaR depends on the time horizon of the 
project as well as on the interest rate which has been chosen. Note that the VaR is relevant when 
one decides to neglect events which are associated with a very low probability (although they 
may have a dramatic impact on the project) because they correspond to events which cannot be 
insured and which can therefore be omitted from the current analysis (natural catastrophes, 
terrorist attack, coup d’état). 
 
The computation of the VaR requires knowledge of the whole distribution of NPVX, and therefore 
of the joint distribution of the yearly returns of the project. Three methods can be envisaged for 
computing the VaR: 
1. The historical analysis assumes that the distribution of the returns can be inferred from the 
distribution of the yearly returns observed in the past for similar projects. This does not rely 
on a parametric distribution of returns. The drawback is that it requires a very large amount of 
data on similar past projects, so that the tails are significantly represented. 
2. The variance-covariance method assumes that the yearly returns are jointly normal, so that the 
joint distribution of returns can be easily computed. The drawback is that the tails can be very 
poorly represented under the normality assumption. 
3. Monte-Carlo methods involve the computation of a non parametric joint distribution of the 
returns. It is less restrictive and more realistic than the previous ones. Its drawback is that it 
requires a very large amount of computations. 
 Although the VaR provides a convenient way of evaluating the risk associated to a project, it has 
been criticized over several aspects briefly discussed below. First, its value is sensitive to the 
method used to compute it (see above), and is therefore to some extent subjective. The VaR is 
more popular in finance, since the time scale (daily or hourly returns over many years) allows 
very large data sets to be used. It is then possible to perform backtesting, that is to compare the 
predicted VaR to the actual fraction of very low returns. Second, the information imbedded in the 
VaR is limited in some sense given that it only provides information on the probability of the 
NPV being lower than some threshold, but does not specify how low the NPV is when it is below 
the threshold. We introduce another measure of risk below, which does not suffer from this 
second drawback. 
2.4. The Conditional Value at Risk 
The Conditional Value at Risk of a project X for a probability p (for example 5%) corresponds to 
the expected value of NPVX conditional on NPVX being lower than q=VaRX(p). The Conditional 
Value at Risk is formally defined by the following equation: 
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The VaR indicates the frontier of the set of the worst events (which may be the most relevant 
information concerning default risk), whereas the CVaR focuses on the average contents of the 
same set. In other words, the VaR indicates the limit for an outcome to be considered among the 
worst ones, whereas the CVaR indicates how bad the worst events are (on average).  
 
It is worth noting that the CVaR can be obtained as the maximization of a concave one-dimension 
function. We transpose the result obtained by Rockafellar and Uryasev (2002) from the case of 
losses to the case of Net Present Value:  
 
Theorem: The VaR and CVaR of a project X  for probability p can be obtained as: 
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Note that the VaR and CVaR are linked by the following relationship: 
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The relationship between VaR and  CVaR is mathematically clear from this equation. Since VaR 
and CVaR measure different properties of the distribution (the first one is a quantile and the 
second one is a conditional tail expectation), we cannot assert for all that that the one is superior 
to the other one from a risk measures point of view. But CVaR has superior properties for 
portfolio optimization for instance: since it can be expressed by a minimization formula,  it can 
be incorporated into problems of optimization that are designed to minimize risk or maximize 
return under risk constraint.  
 
In Figure 3, we represent the CDF of the NPV of a project X with an expected NPV of 600 
million € and a standard deviation of 400 million €. We can observe that the NPV of this project 
is smaller than 185 million € 15% of the time, which means that VaRX(0.15) =1.85. The CVaR 
corresponds to the expected NPV in the 15% worst cases, that is when NPV is less than 1.85. 
Assuming a Gaussian distribution, we obtain CVaRX(0.15) = -0.22, corresponding to an average 
conditional loss of 22 million €. 
2.5. Downside risk measures 
VaR and CVaR are among the most widely used risk measures for managing financial risk, both 
by financial institutions and by institutional investors. However, another class of risk measures 
seems equally important for project management, namely downside risk measures. In this 
section, JA(ξ)  denotes the random variable measuring the return of a project associated to a 
decision A and a random variable ξ with density φA(ξ). For each decision A, the distribution of 
JA(ξ) is induced by the distribution of ξ. The function JA(ξ) is assumed to be increasing. The 
downside risk measures introduced by Bawa and Lindenberg (1977) are based on partial 
moments: 
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where γ ≥ 0 and θ denotes a reference return level. When γ → +∞ , only the worst outcome 
matters (see, e.g., Fishburn, 1977). When γ = 0,  R0(θ)  corresponds to the probability that JA(ξ)< θ. The VaR therefore corresponds to the case γ =0 and θ (p) such that R0(θ (p))=p. When 
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⎡⎤ =− = − ⎣⎦ ∫ E  is called expected shortfall. 
 
An investor who aims at maximizing his expected utility in the context of downside risk 
measures will attach a particular importance to the deviations of JA(ξ) below θ, as measured by 
Rγ(θ), and he will choose the decision which solves the following problem: 
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γ
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where M ≥ 0 measures the investor’s risk aversion. This criterion corresponds to the following 
class of utility functions: 
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For small values of γ, the investor dislikes more small deviations than large deviations below the 
reference level θ. For large values of γ, the investor mainly dislikes large variations below the 
reference level, and he is only interested in the minimum of JA(ξ) when γ tends to infinity. Below 
the reference level θ, the relative risk aversion is: 
 






















Therefore, RR(x)<0 (and the investor is risk lover) when γ <1, whereas he is risk averse when 
γ >1. Note that the relative risk aversion is increasing when 1 < γ  ≤ 2, whereas it may be either 
increasing or decreasing (depending on x) when γ  > 2. 
2.6. Efficiency ratio 
The expected shortfall can be used to define a very simple ratio comparing expected loss and 
expected gain with respect to a reference level. Let X denote a random variable measuring the 
return or NPV of a project and θ denote a reference level, with which X is to be compared. The 
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When comparing different projects, the preferred one is the one which minimizes the efficiency 
ratio. When comparing a single project X to a reference level θ, the project should not be selected 
if the efficiency ratio is larger than 1 since, in that case, expected loss exceeds expected gain. 
3.  Implementation of the different criteria and decision rules 
The simplest way to compare projects is to compare their expected NPVs, which implicitly 
assumes risk neutrality. Risk-averse decision-makers with risk aversion θ   would prefer the Mean-Variance criterion, and select the project X with the largest E(NPVX)- θ  V(NPVX). 
However, the above criteria neglect the asymmetry of the distribution of NPVX and neglect the 
very poor outcomes of the project, which are the most important ones because of default risk. In 
addition, the Mean-Variance criterion implies that, with sufficiently high risk aversion, an agent 
may prefer a distribution that is stochastically dominated by another. To remedy these two last 
drawbacks, we have introduced the VaR. For a given level of probability p  (chosen by the 
decision-maker), project X is preferred to project Y if VaRX(p) > VaRY(p). Recall that the left tail 
of the distribution of NPVX (i.e. the extent of the worst events) is not taken into account by the 
VaR criterion, and that the CVaR meets this criticism. In this case, for a given level of probability 
p (chosen by the decision-maker), project X is preferred to project Y if CVaRX(p)> CVaRY(p). 
However, investors are often mainly interested in comparing the (random) NPV of a new project 
to the (deterministic) NPV of a reference project (existing infrastructure). The above criteria do 
not integrate this fundamental difference between above and below this NPV reference level. The 
downside risk measures, and especially expected shortfall and efficiency ratio, answer this 
criticism. 
 
Importantly, the different criteria listed above may lead to different conclusions, especially when 
some projects have a high expected NPV but a thick left tail. For example, the tail of the double 
exponential distribution is thicker than the tail of the Gaussian distribution. Since the double 
exponential distribution is an extreme value distribution, it is likely to be relevant for some 
parameters of the model. This is illustrated in the example below. 
 
We consider two investments, X and Y, with positive net cash flows Xt and Yt, respectively, 
during two periods (t=1,2) after the investment period (t=0), and 4 scenarios i=1…4. The rate of 
return we use is r=10%. Table 2 sums up the characteristics of the two projects, namely for each 













+ ∑ , and the probability of scenario i. Figures are in Million €. 
 
  Project S=X  Project S=Y 
Scenario  i=1 i=2  i=3 i=4  i=1  i=2 i=3 i=4 
Net cash flow S0,i  -10 -10 -10 -10  -10  -10 -10 -10 
Net cash flow S1,i  10 10  5  5  12  12 7  7 
Net cash flow S2,i  15 11  9  7  13  5  7  10 
NPVS,i  13.66 9.93  3.23  1.37  13.73  6.26  3.30  6.10 
Probability Pr(S,i) 0.25  0.5  0.15  0.1  0.4  0.3  0.1  0.2 
 
Table 2 Characteristics of the two projects 
 
We assume that the NPV of the existing project (reference) is θ =7. Then the expected shortfall 
of project S is: 
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The efficiency ratio is computed according to (23), in which the numerator corresponds to (2) and the denominator is given by: 
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Table 3 sums up the different risk measures for the two projects. 
 
  Project S=X  Project S=Y 
Expected NPV 
Variance of NPV 
Standard deviation of NPV 
Expected Shortfall 
Efficiency ratio 














Table 3 Different risk measures for the two projects 
 
The expected net present values of the two projects are very close, which means that a risk 
neutral investor would be indifferent between the two projects. The variances (and therefore 
standard deviations) of the two projects are also very close, so that the Mean-Variance criterion 
could not give a clear preference to either project. Note the level of risk of the two projects is 
high since the standard deviation of NPV (4 Million €) represents nearly half the expected NPV 
(9 Million €). 
 
The expected shortfall of project X is 1.13, which means that the expected loss of this project 
compared to the reference project is 1.13 Million €. Note that project X leads to a loss with 25% 
chances, which corresponds to scenarios 3 and 4. The expected shortfall of project Y is only 0.77 
Million €, which is far better, whereas the probability of loss is far higher (60%, corresponding to 
scenarios 2, 3 and 4). Project Y has a high probability of small loss, whereas project X has a small 
probability of a very large loss. The expected shortfall criterion is therefore clearly in favor of 
project Y. This is confirmed by the efficiency ratio criterion, which means that the expected loss 
represents only 29% of the expected gain for project Y, whereas it represents 36% for project X. 
Finally, the VaR and CVaR criteria are also clearly in favor of project Y, since the expected NPV 
in the 5% worst cases is only 1.37 Million € for project X, whereas it goes up to 3.30 Million € 
for project Y, which is more than twice the value for project X. Note that, in this example, 
VaR(0.05)=CVaR(0.05) for both projects because the NPV is constant in the 5% worst cases. 
 
Other examples with asymmetric distributions and/or fat tails may lead to more divergence 
between the mean, mean-variance, VaR,  CVaR, expected shortfall and efficiency ratio. This 
implies that all the criteria should be explored when evaluating projects in risky environments, so 
that the importance of the very worst events (with very small probabilities and very severe 
consequences) is correctly weighed against the average value of the project in more common 
events with less severe consequences. 
 
The different criteria necessarily lead to the same conclusion when one project dominates the 
other in the sense of order 1 stochastic dominance. On the other hand, when the CDF functions 
cross, the different criteria may lead to different conclusions for some confidence levels, as is the 
case in the following example, applied to transport investments. We consider three projects of public transport: project A concerns a streetcar, project B concerns a driven bus and project C 
concerns an articulated bus in dedicated lane. We have the following NPV (in Million €) for the 
three projects, according to five levels of the demand, D1 being the highest demand and D5 being 
the lowest demand (p denotes the probability of each demand level). 
 










A: Streetcar  100  50  30  11  10 
B: Driven bus  65  70  40  12  5 
C: Articulated bus in dedicated lane  35  45  50  55  60 
 
We assume that the NPV of the existing project is equal to 45 Million Euros. The following table 
sums up the different risk criteria for the three projects. 
 
  Project A  Project B Project C Projects Ranking 
Expected NPV  51.1  55.45  45.5  B>A>C 
Expected utility (U(x)=ln(x))  3.74  3.84  3.8  B>C>A 
CVaR at p= 0.1  10.5  8.5  35  C>A>B 
VaR at p= 0.1  11  12  35  C>B>A 
Savage («  minmax  », see end of 
Section 1.2) 
50 55  65  A>B>C 
Expected shortfall (NPV of the 
existing project=45) 
7.4 6.05 2  C>B>A 
Efficiency ratio (NPV of the 
existing project=45) 
0.55 0.37  0.8  B>A>C 
 
On this example, we observe that each of the projects can be potentially selected as the best 
project or as the worst project, according to the risk criterion which we consider. 
The expected NPV and the expected utility criteria lead to select project B, but they do not select 
the same project as the worst project (project C is the worst project for the expected NPV 
criterion, whereas project A is given as the worst project by the expected utility criterion). Project 
B is also given as the best project by the efficiency ratio, given that the NPV of the existing 
project is equal to 45 Million Euros (the expected loss represents only 37% of the expected gain 
for project B). Let us notice that for each project, the efficiency ratio is lower than 1, which 
means that expected gain exceeds expected loss with respect to the reference NPV of the existing 
infrastructure for each project. 
According to the VaR at p=0.1, the CVaR at p=0.1 and the expected shortfall criteria, the best 
project is project C. The CVaR and the expected shortfall do not classify the projects in the same 
order as the three previous criteria (expected NPV, expected utility and efficiency ratio), because 
contrary to the previous criteria, the CVaR and the expected shortfall focus only on the worst 
scenarios: for each project, the CVaR at p=0.1 gives the expected NPV for the 10% worst 
scenarios, and the expected shortfall gives the expected deviation of the NPV below the NPV of 
the existing infrastructure. The VaR at p=0.1 gives for each project the minimum NPV among the 
90% best cases. 
Finally, the Savage criterion leads to select project A. Note that project A is selected by none of 
the other risk criteria. The explication of this particular classification is the following one. The 
Savage criterion selects the project with the smallest maximum regret. Regret is defined as the difference between the NPV of the project and the amount that could have been obtained if the 
state of nature could have been correctly forecast. For each project, the maximum possible regret 
is picked. Then, the project that has the lowest maximum regret is selected. In other words, 
contrary to the other criteria, the Savage criterion is the only criterion affected by the joint 
distribution of the NPV. 
 
We argue that, in that case, no project should clearly be preferred to the other, that the investor 
has to be aware of this ambiguity, and that the various tools described here can help him weigh 
the different arguments in favour of each project. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
We proposed in this paper different approaches used in finance as useful tools to model the 
impact of risk in project evaluation, and we compared them on basic examples. Based on simple 
examples, we show that the criteria usually used in finance may lead to different conclusions 
regarding the best or the worst project. We argue that no criterion is a priori better than the 
others, and that the decision-maker has to envisage different criteria in order to weigh the 
different arguments in favour of each project, based on his own preferences and objectives. 
 
We are still some way from the situation where the correct tools will be used to take risk into 
account in the cost-benefit analysis. The next step, in our opinion, will be to use some other 
sophisticated tools developed in finance: “the theory of real option”, which will play an essential 
role in the strategic management of investment in a risky situation. These tools will allow a 
market price to be associated with a project. The idea is to duplicate a project with financial 
instruments which have a market price. This is rather easy when markets are complete. It is not 
clear and unfortunately unlikely that this is true in the case of large project investments. 
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